Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 61

Number 1

Article 11

2-12-2021

Can Track and Field’s Governing Body Ban Female Runners From
Competing in the U.S. Because of High Testosterone Levels?
Katz, Ronald S.
Luckinbill, Robert W.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald S. Katz & Robert W. Luckinbill, Can Track and Field’s Governing Body Ban Female Runners From
Competing in the U.S. Because of High Testosterone Levels?, 61 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 331 (2020).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

CAN TRACK AND FIELD’S GOVERNING BODY BAN
FEMALE RUNNERS FROM COMPETING IN THE U.S.
BECAUSE OF HIGH TESTOSTERONE LEVELS?
Ronald S. Katz* and Robert W. Luckinbill**
This article explores the applicability, if any, in the United States
of a decision rendered by a private sports arbitration organization in
Lausanne, Switzerland: the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The
decision validated regulations of World Athletics—the private organization that governs track and field internationally—which had the effect of
banning an Olympic champion, Caster Semenya of South Africa, from
international competition against females because she had testosterone
levels that World Athletics deemed too high.
The article focuses on the fact that the CAS decision uses the law of
Monaco to decide the matter. CAS specifically states that the decision
may not apply in other countries like the U.S. CAS expressly leaves such
decisions to the courts of the respective countries involved.
The article then explores the reasoning of CAS with respect to both
the U.S. law of discrimination and the law of evidence. The article concludes that the CAS decision would not stand up under either set of laws
in the United States. In particular, most of the evidence relied on by
CAS would not be admissible in U.S. courts because of the standards set
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
that prohibit expert testimony not in accord with generally accepted scientific standards.

* Ronald S. Katz is Senior Counsel at GCA Law Partners LLP in Mountain View,
California, and was one of the expert witnesses for Caster Semenya in the arbitration proceeding referenced in this article. He is a co-author along with Jack Bowen, Jeffrey R. Mitchell,
Donald J. Polden, and Richard Walden of the textbook SPORT, ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP
(2017).
** Robert W. Luckinbill is a Partner with GCA Law Partners LLP in Mountain View,
California. Messrs. Katz and Luckinbill co-authored Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport,
28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2017).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2019, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), a private
body headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, issued a decision (“the
Arbitration Award”) against a South African middle-distance runner,
Caster Semenya.1 In the decision, the arbitration panel ruled that Ms.
Semenya—whom all parties to the arbitration and the arbitration panel
itself acknowledged is legally a woman—and runners like her, with naturally-occurring testosterone levels deemed too high by the sport’s governing body, World Athletics, will have to comply with recently adopted

1. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 2, ¶ 3, 163, ¶ 1 (2019).
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regulations, and take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to compete internationally.2
The arbitration panel applied the law of Monaco, expressly declining to rule on the law of other jurisdictions:3 “[T]he Panel . . . cannot
come to a conclusion on whether or not the [World Athletics] . . . Regulations would be found to be unenforceable in, or contrary to the domestic law of, different national jurisdictions.”4
Since USA Track and Field, Inc. (“USATF”) is an affiliate of World
Athletics, analyzing whether the decision would apply in the United
States is not merely an academic exercise, as many more international
track meets—including the World Championships scheduled for 2022 in
Eugene, Oregon—occur in the U.S. than in Monaco.5 This article will
explore how a U.S. court would rule if Ms. Semenya, or someone similarly situated,6 brought a case in a U.S. federal court to enjoin the application of World Athletics’ Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development) (DSD
Regulations).
After providing some background, this article briefly describes, for
context, a closely related CAS arbitration that set the stage for the Semenya arbitration. The earlier arbitration was won by a female runner
who, like Ms. Semenya, had testosterone levels deemed too high.7 In its
decision, the CAS determined, inter alia, that athletic ability was too
complex to depend on any one factor like testosterone.8 That case, which
the panel that issued the recent arbitration decision in Semenya’s case
2. Sean Ingle, Semenya loses landmark legal case against IAAF over testosterone levels,
GUARDIAN
(May
1,
2019,
6:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/may/01/caster-semenya-loses-landmark-legal-case-iaaf-athletics. World
Athletics was formerly known as the International Association of Athletics Federations
(“IAAF”). About World Athletics, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathletics.org/about-iaaf (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). For purposes of clarity, the organization will be
referred to herein as World Athletics except in quotations and titles where the former name
was used.
3. Semenya, CAS 2018/O/5794 at 110, ¶ 424.
4. Id. at 145, ¶ 555.
5. See, e.g., Calendar/Results, WORLD ATHLETICS (2020), https://www.worldathletics.org/competition/calendar/2019#180 (showing that in 2019, there were six World Athletics
events in the United States and one event in Monaco); World Athletics Championships Oregon22
to
be
Held
July
15-24,
2022,
USATF
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.usatf.org/news/2020/world-athletics-championships-oregon22-to-be-held[hereinafter Oregon22].
6. Oregon22, supra note 5.
7. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759, Interim Arbitral Award,
5, ¶16, 2, ¶1 (2015).
8. Id. at 154, ¶ 532 (“[W]hile the evidence indicates that higher levels of naturally occurring testosterone may increase athletic performance, the Panel is not satisfied that the degree of that advantage is more significant than the advantage derived from the numerous other
variables which the parties acknowledge also affect female athletic performance . . . .”).

334

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

did not consider as a binding precedent,9 helps to illuminate the Arbitration Award. This article will then analyze the evidence and arguments
set forth in the Arbitration Award.
This article will then set out arguments that would likely be made
in a U.S. court, both for and against any female athlete challenging the
requirement that she take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to
compete. Finally, the article will reach a conclusion on whether a U.S.
court would be likely to strike down the World Athletics regulations in
question for purposes of U.S. competitions.
II. BACKGROUND
The international track world has struggled with how to treat female
competitors whose bodies produce a naturally-occurring amount of testosterone deemed too high by World Athletics. Such a condition, known
as hyperandrogenism, results in the production of an excess amount of
androgen (such as testosterone) and occurs in five to ten percent of
women.10 World Athletics initially adopted a set of regulations dealing
with this topic entitled Regulations Governing Eligibility of Females
with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competitions.11 After
the Hyperandrogenism Regulations were successfully challenged by Indian sprinter Dutee Chand,12 World Athletics adopted the DSD Regulations.13 Basically, the DSD Regulations mandate that female competitors whose bodies contain more testosterone than World Athletics deems
appropriate must take testosterone-reducing hormones in order to compete internationally.14
Ms. Semenya challenged the legality of the DSD Regulations at the
CAS.15 She asserted a number of claims, including that the regulations
9. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 122, ¶ 471 (2019).
10. Susie East, Should a woman’s testosterone level matter in sports?, CNN (Aug. 12,
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/health/testosterone-and-hyperandrogenism-in-female-athletes/index.html.
11. See generally IAAF, IAAF REGULATIONS GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY OF FEMALES
WITH HYPERANDROGENISM TO COMPETE IN WOMEN’S COMPETITIONS (2011),
https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IAAF-RegulationsGoverning-Eligibility-of-Females-with-Hyperandrogenism-to-Compete-inWomen%E2%80%99s-Competition-In-force-as-from-1st-May-2011-6.pdf
[hereinafter
HYPERANDROGENISM REGULATIONS].
12. See infra Section III.
13. See IAAF, ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS FOR THE FEMALE CLASSIFICATION
(ATHLETES WITH DIFFERENCES OF SEX DEVELOPMENT) 3, ¶ 2.3 (2019) [hereinafter DSD
REGULATIONS].
14. Id. at 3, ¶ 2.3(b).
15. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 2, ¶ 1 (2019).
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discriminate “on the basis of sex and/or gender.”16 Although World Athletics prevailed in the arbitration, it was a narrow victory, decided pursuant to the laws of Monaco,17 where World Athletics is headquartered.18
As noted above, the Arbitration Award expressly states that the panel
did not decide the arbitration based on law other than that of Monaco.19
As a result, enforceability of the DSD Regulations outside of Monaco
“will ultimately be a matter for the courts of the various jurisdictions in
question to determine.”20
Ms. Semenya appealed the Arbitration Award to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal, Switzerland’s supreme court.21 On August 25, 2020, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by Ms. Semenya.22
The Court found that “[t]he Court of Arbitration for Sport had the right
to uphold the conditions of participation issued for female athletes with
the genetic variant ‘46 XY DSD’ in order to guarantee fair competition
for certain running disciplines in female athletics.”23 Regardless of the
result of the appeal, the enforceability of the DSD Regulations is, by the
express language of the Arbitration Award, an open question in the U.S.
III. DUTEE CHAND V. IAAF: PRECURSOR TO THE SEMENYA
ARBITRATION
Indian sprinter Dutee Chand, who, like Ms. Semenya, had higher
levels of naturally occurring testosterone than deemed appropriate by
World Athletics,24 prevailed in a CAS arbitration against World Athletics regarding regulations that would have prevented her from competing
because of her testosterone level.25 The CAS panel in the matter involving Ms. Semenya expressly stated, however, that “the findings and
16. Id. at 2, ¶ 2.
17. Id. at 110, ¶ 424.
18. About World Athletics, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathletics.org/aboutiaaf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
19. See Semenya, CAS 2018/O/5794 at 109-10, ¶¶ 421-24 (explaining the decision to
apply the law of Monaco in this case).
20. Id. at 145, ¶ 555.
21. Associated Press, Caster Semenya appeals testosterone ruling: ‘The IAAF will not drug
me,’ L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/olympics/la-spcaster-semenya-appeals-testosterone-ruling-20190529-story.html.
22. Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, DSD Regulations: Caster Semenya’s
Appeal Against the Decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Dismissed (Sept. 8, 2020)
[hereinafter Press Release, DSD Regulations]; see Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns,
4A_248/2019 & 4A_398/2019, Judgment, (1st Court of Civil Law 2020).
23. Press Release, DSD Regulations, supra note 22.
24. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759, Interim Arbitral Award,
8, ¶¶ 27-29 (2015).
25. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/5798,
Executive Summary, 1, ¶¶ 2-4 (2019), https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Executive_Summary__5794_.pdf.
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decision in Chand are in no way binding on this Panel,”26 at least in part
because the prior arbitral ruling related to a different set of regulations.27
Ms. Chand had an outstanding junior career, primarily focusing on
the “200 metres sprint and the 4 x 400-metre sprint relay.”28 However,
Ms. Chand’s ability to continue competing was called into question in
2011 when World Athletics published its Hyperandrogenism Regulations.29
These regulations were intended to determine the eligibility of
women with hyperandrogenism to compete in women’s track and field
meets.30 Pursuant to the regulations, females with hyperandrogenism
would be eligible to compete in women’s meets only if they participated
in a three-level medical process and were determined to have androgen
levels that World Athletics deemed appropriate.31
After undergoing certain medical testing as required by the Athletics Federation of India (“AFI”), the Indian affiliate of World Athletics,
Ms. Chand was notified that she would not be permitted to participate in
the World Championships or the Commonwealth Games “because her
‘male hormone’ levels were too high.”32 Subsequently, she was “provisionally suspended from participating” in any sporting events.33
Ms. Chand filed an appeal with the CAS against the AFI and World
Athletics. 34 Ms. Chand claimed that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations
discriminated against female athletes with “a particular natural physical
characteristic” and were “based on flawed factual assumptions about the
relationship between testosterone and athletic performance.”35 World
Athletics contested each of Ms. Chand’s assertions.36
In July 2015, the panel of arbitrators unanimously issued an interim
arbitration award finding in favor of Ms. Chand.37 The arbitrators held
that the male and female categories of competition are intended to cover
all athletes; the arbitrators also expressed their concern that those like

26. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 122, ¶ 471 (2019).
27. Id.
28. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2, ¶ 1.
29. Id. at 14-22, ¶¶ 41-68.
30. Id. at 14, ¶ 42.
31. HYPERANDROGENISM REGULATIONS, supra note 11, at 5. A female needed androgen
less than or equal to ten nanomoles per liter or to have an androgen resistance such that they
would not have a competitive advantage from the elevated levels of androgen. Id. at 12.
32. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 5, ¶¶ 14-16.
33. Id. at 8, ¶ 27.
34. Id. at 10, ¶ 32.
35. Id. at 2, ¶ 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 160, ¶¶ 1-8.
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Ms. Chand might not be allowed to compete at all.38 Specifically, the
arbitrators found that:
On the basis of the evidence currently before the Panel, the Panel is
unable to conclude on the balance of probabilities that androgen-sensitive hyperandrogenic female athletes enjoy such a substantial performance advantage over non-hyperandrogenic female athletes that
excluding them from competing in the female category, and thereby
excluding them from competing at all unless they take medication or
undergo treatment, is a necessary and proportionate means of preserving fairness in athletics competition and/or policing the binary
male/female classification.39

The CAS panel specifically found that numerous other factors, including
“nutrition, access to specialist training facilities and coaching, and other
genetic and biological variations,” may increase athletic performance.40
The arbitrators suspended the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for a
period of two years, subject to World Athletics submitting additional evidence and expert reports on the “actual degree of athletic performance
advantage sustained by hyperandrogenic female athletes as compared to
non-hyperandrogenic female athletes.”41 Absent such a submission, the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations would be deemed void after the twoyear suspension.42
After obtaining an extension to submit additional evidence, World
Athletics submitted materials to the CAS “including expert reports and
legal submissions.”43 Among the materials submitted were “draft revised regulations that would only apply to female track events over distances of between 400 meters and one mile.”44 World Athletics also
submitted as its primary analysis a 2017 article from the British Journal
of Sports Medicine (BG17).45
38. Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 148, ¶¶ 512-13.
39. Id. at 154, ¶ 532.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 160, ¶ 3.
42. Id. at 158, ¶ 548.
43. Media Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport Media Release, The Application of the
IAAF Hyperandrogenism Regulations Remain Suspended (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.tascas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release_3759_Jan_2018.pdf [hereinafter CAS Media
Release].
44. Id.
45. See Press Release, International Association of Athletics Federations, Levelling the
playing field in female sport: new research published in the British Journal of Sports Medicine
(July 3, 2017), https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/hyperandrogenism-research; IAAF decides to take Dutee Chand gender case back to court, TIMES NOW (July 4,
2017), https://www.timesnownews.com/sports/article/iaaf-decided-to-take-dutee-chand-gender-case-back-to-court/65056; Stéphane Bermon & Pierre-Yves Garnier, Serum Androgen
Levels and Their Relation to Performance in Track and Field: Mass Spectrometry Results
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The CAS determined that World Athletics’ submission of additional evidence was sufficiently compliant but, with the consent of the
parties, suspended the proceedings for six months, during which the
World Athletics Hyperandrogenism Regulations would remain suspended.46 Moreover, the CAS decreed that the arbitration proceedings
would continue in the event World Athletics decided not to withdraw the
existing regulations, and would be terminated in the event World Athletics withdrew the existing regulations or replaced them with the proposed new regulations.47
In March 2018, World Athletics informed the CAS that it was going
to withdraw the Hyperandrogenism Regulations challenged by Ms.
Chand and replace them with the DSD Regulations, which were enacted
in April 2018,48 and came into effect on November 1, 2018,49 providing
the predicate for Ms. Semenya’s arbitration.
IV. CASTER SEMENYA V. IAAF
The first words in the Arbitration Award under the heading
“MERITS” are
Ms. Semenya is a woman. At birth, it was determined that she was
female . . . . She has been raised as a woman. She has lived as a
woman. She has run as a woman. She is—and always has been—
recognized in law as a woman and has always identified as a
woman.50

Obviously, Ms. Semenya’s legal sex was not what the case was about.
Rather, according to World Athletics, the case turned on whether she had
a so-called “male sports sex.”51 That determination, in turn, depended
on the testimony of numerous expert witnesses on both sides.52 Ultimately, the majority of the panel agreed with the experts offered by
World Athletics,53 although the panel did not specifically rule on the
term “male sports sex.”54 Instead, the ruling was on the issue whether
from 2127 Observations in Male and Female Elite Athletes, 51 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 1, 2
(May 15, 2017).
46. CAS Media Release, supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS
2018/5798, Executive Summary, 1, ¶¶ 4-5 (2019), https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Executive_Summary__5794_.pdf.
49. See Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS
2018/O/5798, Arbitral Award, 3, ¶ 10 (2019).
50. Id. at 118, ¶ 454.
51. Id. at 132-33, ¶¶ 501-07.
52. See id. at 4-10, ¶¶ 15-53, 12-15, ¶¶ 56-71, 17-22, ¶¶ 79-108.
53. See id. at 108, ¶ 415, 160, ¶ 626.
54. Id. at 133, ¶ 507.
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intersex women “have an athletic advantage over other female athletes
and, if so, whether the magnitude of that advantage is capable of subverting fair competition in certain athletic events.”55
The expert testimony depended on questions relating to endocrinology and other complex areas of science, which are beyond the scope of
this article. What will be explored below, however, are undisputed facts
about the evidence on which a majority of the arbitration panel relied.
The primary public World Athletics arguments were set out in
BG17, the British Journal of Sports Medicine article previously submitted by World Athletics in connection with the Dutee Chand arbitration,
and referenced in section III, supra. A number of key undisputed facts
undermine the credibility and viability of BG17, however.
The first undisputed fact about that article is that it was co-authored
by a consultant and an employee of World Athletics, Stéphane Bermon
and Pierre Yves-Garnier, respectively.56 At the end of the article there
is a “Disclaimer” in bold type that reads, in relevant part:
SB [Stéphane Bermon] is a medical and scientific consultant for the
IAAF and a member of the IAAF and IOC working groups on hyperandrogenic female athletes and transgender athletes and for that
purpose appeared as a witness in the Dutee Chand vs IAAF CAS
case. PYG [Pierre Yves-Garnier] is the director of the IAAF Health
and Science Department . . . .57

The fact that the co-authors of the article are employed or retained by
World Athletics creates a serious conflict of interest; it is unlikely in the
extreme that they would write anything against the interests of the organization that signs their paychecks.
The second undisputed fact about that article is that some of the
data on which it was based was problematic. That fact was expressly
noted in a New York Times article,58 and also acknowledged by Mr. Bermon, who co-authored BG17, in a second article on the topic that appeared in the British Journal of Sports Medicine (BHKE18).59
The second article begins “[w]e thank our colleagues for their constructive comments that relate to [BG17].” It goes on to state that “[t]o
55. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award,. at 133, ¶ 507.
56. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 6.
57. Id.
58. See Jeré Longman, Did Flawed Data Lead Track Astray on Testosterone in Women?,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/sports/iaaf-caster-semenya.html.
59. See Stéphane Bermon, Angelica Lindén Hirschberg, Jan Kowalski & Emma Eklund,
Serum androgen levels are positively correlated with athletic performance and competition
results in elite female athletes, 52 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 1531, 1531-32 (2018).
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address the other criticisms, we have now performed a sensitivity analysis using a modified data set in which (1) observations from athletes
who participated in both World Championships were only counted
once . . . .”60 The result was that the authors of BHKE18 “excluded 230
observations, corrected some data capture errors and performed the modified analysis on a population of 1102 female athletes.”61 This significant change in the data used to perform the analysis is an acknowledgment that the data relied upon in drafting BG17 was questionable.
The third undisputed fact relates to peer review of the articles. The
co-authors of BG17 state at the end that it was “externally peer reviewed,”62 although clearly that alleged external peer review did not detect some serious errors. However, the co-authors of BHKE18 state at
the end of the article that it was “internally peer reviewed.”63 Internal
peer review, which is undefined and appears to be a contradiction in
terms, does not rise to the level of a trusted peer review of a scientific
work.
The fourth undisputed fact is that, although the Arbitration Award
upheld the DSD Regulations as they relate to the one mile and the 1500meter races, it acknowledges that the evidence presented by World Athletics is sparse at best, and speculative at worst with respect to those included races.64 Regarding speculation, the Arbitration Award states that
[o]n the basis of the evidence presented to the Panel, the IAAF’s decision to include the 1500m and 1 mile events within the list of Restricted Events seems to be based, at least in part, on speculation that
athletes who compete in the 800m also compete successfully in the
1500m and 1 mile.65

Regarding sparseness, the Arbitration Award states that “the evidence of
actual (in contrast to theoretical) significant athletic advantage by a sufficient number of 46 XY DSD athletes [females with high testosterone
levels] in the 1500m and 1 mile events could be described as sparse.”66

60. Id. at 1531.
61. Id.
62. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 6.
63. Bermon et al., supra note 59, at 1532.
64. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 156, ¶¶ 608-09 (2019).
65. Id. at 156, ¶ 608.
66. Id. at 160, ¶ 623.
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V. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ENFORCEMENT OF
DSD REGULATIONS IN THE U.S.
Should Caster Semenya or someone similarly situated challenge the
validity of the DSD Regulations in an American court, there are several
arguments that World Athletics might assert to justify the existence of
those regulations. What follows is an analysis of those arguments and
the likely responses with respect to each.
A. Do U.S. Courts have Jurisdiction?
1. World Athletics will likely contend that the CAS has exclusive
jurisdiction
The World Athletics Constitution provides that final decisions
made by World Athletics under its Constitution “may be appealed exclusively to the CAS (Appeal Arbitration Division) which will resolve
the dispute definitively in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration.”67 Moreover, the DSD Regulations expressly state:
Any dispute between the IAAF and an affected athlete (and/or her
Member Federation) in connection with these Regulations will be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CAS. In particular (but
without limitation), the validity, legality and/or proper interpretation
or application of the Regulations may only be challenged (a) by way
of ordinary proceedings filed before the CAS; and/or (b) as part of
an appeal to the CAS made pursuant to clause 5.3.68 (emphasis
added)

In addition, the DSD Regulations provide:
The decision of the CAS will be final and binding on all parties, and
no right of appeal will lie from that decision. All parties waive irrevocably any right to any form of appeal, review or recourse by or
in any court or judicial authority in respect of such decision, insofar
as such waiver may be validly made.69

As a result, World Athletics likely would contend that the CAS has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on claims such as those that might be brought
by Ms. Semenya or another challenger to the DSD Regulations. Ms.
Semenya, who did not object to the jurisdiction of the CAS,70 pursued

67. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATHLETICS FEDERATIONS (IAAF)
CONSTITUTION § 84.3 (2019).
68. DSD REGULATIONS, supra note 13, at 10.
69. Id.
70. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 109, ¶ 418 (2019).
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arbitration before a CAS panel.71 As a result, litigation before other tribunals would be contrary to the express provisions of the World Athletics Constitution and the DSD Regulations.
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations
Ms. Semenya, or another challenger to the DSD Regulations, can
happily concede that the CAS has exclusive jurisdiction and that the
CAS decision is final and binding on all parties. This concession would
be helpful to Ms. Semenya because, as noted in Sections I and II, supra,
the CAS stated that it could not rule on the law of jurisdictions different
from Monaco, including the U.S.72 The final holding of the Arbitration
Award left such rulings “for the courts of the various jurisdictions in
question to determine,”73 including the courts of the United States.
Ms. Semenya would have standing to sue in the U.S. because a track
meet there would be under the auspices of the USATF,74 the U.S. affiliate of World Athletics.75 The Bylaws of the USATF provide that one of
its duties is to implement the regulations of World Athletics, which purport to benefit track and field athletes: “USATF is affiliated to the WA
[World Athletics] . . . USATF shall recognize accept, apply, observe and
abide by the Constitution, Rules and Regulations of the WA . . . as
amended from time to time, unless any of these documents conflict with
federal or state law.”76
There is no doubt that U.S. courts have personal jurisdiction over
the USATF, a non-profit organization incorporated in Virginia,77 with
its headquarters and principal place of business in Indianapolis, Indiana.78 USATF can be, and has been, sued in U.S. courts.79
It is also clear that Ms. Semenya would have standing to sue the
USATF because, as a participant in a meet held by USATF in the U.S.,

71. Id. at 4, ¶ 14.
72. Id. at 145, ¶ 555.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Oregon22, supra note 5.
75. USATF, 2020 GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK § 3(B)(14) (2020).
76. Id.
77. Clerk’s Information System, VA. ST. CORP. COMMISSION, https://cis.scc.virginia.gov/EntitySearch/BusinessInformation?businessId=78443&businessType=Nonstock%20Corporation&Source=fromFormation&isSeries=False (last visited Sept. 27, 2020);
Tax Information, USATF, https://www.usatf.org/about/financials/tax-information (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
78. About, USATF, https://www.usatf.org/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
79. See, e.g., Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Strike Paragraphs 17 & 24 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Logan v. USA Track & Field, Inc., Cause No. 1:10-cv-1315-TWP-TAB
(S.D. Ind. 2010).
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she is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between World Athletics
and the USATF. There is precedent to support this proposition.
In a case brought by a college athlete against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), the collegiate sports governing
organization, the athlete’s standing was based on his status as a thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the NCAA and one of its members, the University of Colorado, where the athlete attended.80 The court
stated:
A person not a party to an express contract may bring an action on
the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the
nonparty, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely
incidental benefit of the contract . . . the NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and regulations evidence a clear intent to benefit student-athletes. And because each student-athlete’s eligibility to compete is
determined by the NCAA, we conclude that Bloom had standing . . .
to contest the meaning or applicability of NCAA eligibility restrictions . . . . See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (given importance of NCAA’s function to benefit studentathletes and NCAA’s role in determining eligibility of student-athletes, court assumed student athlete was likely to succeed in proving
third-party beneficiary standing vis-a-vis the contract between the
NCAA and its members); see also NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d
1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
....
. . . [T]o the extent Bloom’s claim of arbitrary and capricious action asserts a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing that
is implied in the contractual relationship between the NCAA and its
members, his position as a third-party beneficiary of that contractual
relationship affords him standing to pursue this claim . . . . [S]ee also
Hall v. NCAA, supra, 985 F. Supp. at 784 (implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing ‘requires that a party vested with contractual discretion exercise that discretion reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously’).81

Thus, it is readily apparent that Ms. Semenya or someone else pursuing
a claim would be able to do so as a third-party beneficiary.

80. Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004).
81. Id. at 623-24.
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B. Should U.S. Courts Defer to Policies on Internal Management of
Private Sports Organizations?
1. World Athletics will likely contend that U.S. courts should
refuse to interfere in the internal management of private
sports organizations
There is a longstanding common law rule that courts should be reluctant to intervene or interfere in the internal management of private
organizations.82 This rule was intended to allow such organizations to
establish their own rules and policies and abide by those rules without
interference from outside forces.
The theory behind this non-interference doctrine is that the individual members of such associations have the freedom to choose their
associates and the conditions of their association; further, it is argued, judicial review of the affairs of such associations would violate
this basic principle of the freedom to associate. . . . [Moreover,] the
rules and regulations upon which these associations operate are often
unclear, and the courts would have no available standard upon which
to determine the reasonableness of their rules.83

The same is true when it comes to private sports organizations.84

82. See, e.g., Plummer v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97 F.3d 220, 226 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion Cty., 233 Ind. 235, 117
N.E.2d 553, 555 (1954)) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Indiana has recognized in very clear terms,
private voluntary associations do have a “sacred right” to make, interpret, and enforce rules
governing the ethical conduct of their own members”); Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc’y,
34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 796 (1961) (New Jersey Supreme Court stated “Courts have
been understandably reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of membership associations
and their reluctance has ordinarily promoted the health of society”); Screwmen’s Benevolent
Ass’n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 554, 13 S.W. 379, 380 (1890) (Texas Supreme Court held that
by being a member of private organization, “the member assents to and accepts the constitution, and impliedly binds himself to abide by the decision of such boards as that instrument
may provide”); Am. Fed’n of Tech. Eng’rs, Local 144 v. La Jeunesse, 63 Ill. 2d 263, 268, 347
N.E.2d 712, 715 (1976) (Illinois Supreme Court expressed “[i]t is generally held that courts
. . . will not intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and matters of discipline in voluntary associations”).
83. Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 556-57 (Ala. 1979) [citations omitted].
That case in turn cites cases as far back as 1884 in support of that proposition: Weatherly v.
Med. & Surgical Soc’y of Montgomery Cty., 76 Ala. 567 (1884); see also NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky.
2001).
84. See, e.g., Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 656 (5th Cir. 1977);
Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n. for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1988);
Schulz v. U. S. Boxing Ass’n, 105 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[c]ourts have been understandably reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of [private] associations and their reluctance has ordinarily promoted the health of society”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 542 (7th Cir. 1978).

2020]

BANNING FEMALE RUNNERS FOR HIGH TESTOSTERONE

345

Ms. Semenya and those similarly situated voluntarily chose to participate in international track and field competitions. The governing
bodies for each country and the international governing bodies of such
competitions get to set the rules for participation.85 World Athletics
would contend that the courts should not interfere with the policies and
procedures established by those organizations in seeking to manage the
internal workings of the organizations themselves, and the sporting
events that they oversee.
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations
U.S. courts have frequently judged the activities of private sports
organizations like World Athletics and USATF.86 Although courts are
reluctant to interfere in the affairs of private athletic organizations, they
will do so, and have done so—particularly concerning matters of eligibility, as in this case—when “the actions of an association are the result
of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, collusion, arbitrariness, or are in violation
of or contravene any principle of public policy.”87
The U.S. Supreme Court has delineated the standard for what is arbitrary and capricious.88 As with interfering into the affairs of a private
athletic association, courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for
that of an administrative agency, but will do so if agency actions are
arbitrary and capricious:
The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’89

Moreover, although the courts are generally hesitant to intervene in the
affairs of private associations, they will intervene when the actions of
private organizations contravene public policy.90 Clearly, a private
85. See, e.g., Book of Rules, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://www.worldathletics.org/aboutiaaf/documents/book-of-rules (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
86. See, e.g., Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Or.
2016), aff’d, 899 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2018); Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505 U.S.
1301 (1992).
87. Gulf South Conference, 369 So. 2d at 557.
88. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
89. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)). In the Motor Vehicles case, the agency’s action was determined by the U.S. Supreme
Court to be arbitrary and capricious, and the matter was therefore remanded to the agency for
further consideration consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 56-57.
90. See, e.g., Gulf South Conference, 369 So. 2d at 557; Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med.
Soc’y, 34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 796 (1961).
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organization establishing rules that are in violation of discrimination
laws intended to protect members of classes that have historically been
discriminated against would be a public policy the courts would seek to
protect.
The courts will intervene when the underlying conduct is arbitrary
and capricious or when the policies of sports organizations are contrary
to public policy, even in cases involving private sports organization.
C. Are the DSD Regulations a Justified and Proportionate Way to
Ensure Fairness?
1. World Athletics will contend that the DSD Regulations are a
“justified and proportionate means of ensuring
consistent treatment, and preserving fair and meaningful
competition within the female classification.”91
The basic position of World Athletics has been that the DSD Regulations are not discriminatory, but that, even if found discriminatory,
they are “necessary, reasonable and proportionate to the achievement of
a legitimate objective.”92 World Athletics further has contended that the
DSD Regulations are:
based on a strong scientific, legal and ethical foundation . . . [and]
establish a framework governing the eligibility of 46 XY DSD athletes to compete in the female category that is logical and rational
and fully respects the requirement that like cases should be treated
alike and different cases should be treated differently.93

Furthermore, World Athletics has asserted that it is “both entitled and
required to provide male and female athletes with an equal chance to
excel in elite-level athletics.”94 In order to allow females to have such a
chance, World Athletics must have separate categories of competition
for men and women, and must prevent competitors with significant biological advantages from competing against women.95 World Athletics
has further asserted that women athletes determined to have male chromosomes (i.e., XY rather than XX) are “ ‘ biologically identical’ to male
athletes (save with respect to virilisation of external genitals) . . . [and]
derive performance benefits from their physiology that are

91. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 108, ¶ 415 (2019).
92. Id. at 144, ¶ 548.
93. Id. at 71, ¶ 286.
94. Id. at 71, ¶ 287.
95. Id. at 71-73, ¶¶ 287-89.
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indistinguishable from the advantages derived by male athletes.”96 Finally, World Athletics has contended that it had to take steps “to remove
or at least minimise as much as possible those ergogenic advantages.”97
World Athletics has argued, and can be expected to continue arguing, that the DSD Regulations are thus necessary to ensure a fair and
balanced playing field.98 Given that athletes like Ms. Semenya can compete against females in international competitions if they take steps to
reduce their testosterone to acceptable levels,99 World Athletics contends
that the DSD Regulations are reasonable and proportionate. “In the absence of the DSD Regulations, the divide between the male and female
categories would be policed by legal sex or self-declarations of gender
identity, thereby denying female athletes an equal chance to excel in
sport.”100
2. Likely Response of Challenger to DSD Regulations
Ms. Semenya would likely respond that the evidence submitted in
support of World Athletics’ position is not admissible under U.S. law.
Rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence permits testimony by a
qualified expert only if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”101
The landmark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (now codified in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence), set standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence to
be applied by the trial court judge.102 The court mandates the use of
scientific knowledge, but:
in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony
must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’
based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s
testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of
evidentiary reliability.103

The Daubert Court set out criteria for “whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.”104 One of these
96. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 75, ¶ 296 (2019).
97. Id. (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 76, ¶ 300.
99. Id. at 77, ¶ 307.
100. Id. at 79, ¶ 311.
101. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
102. Id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579-98 (1993).
103. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
104. Id. at 593.
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criteria is whether the knowledge “can be (and has been) tested.”105
“ ‘ Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is
what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.’ ” 106
A second criteria set by the Daubert Court is “whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”107 Although the court acknowledges that publication is not essential for admissibility—for example, for “well-grounded but innovative theories”—
it would support admissibility because “submission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because
it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected.”108
A third criteria set out by the Daubert Court is “general acceptance.”109 The court notes that “[w]idespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible . . . .”110
U.S. courts applying the above criteria likely would rule that World
Athletics’ evidence supporting the DSD Regulation is inadmissible.
First, as noted in Section IV, supra, regarding the 1500m and one-mile
races, the evidence is either speculative or sparse. Not only does that
level of evidence not meet the standards of Daubert, but also it does not
amount to the preponderance of evidence necessary to meet the burden
of proof in a civil case in the U.S.
Second, as also noted above in Section IV, it is undisputed that the
key empirical, publicly known data on which the evidence is based is
flawed. The scientists who first reported these flaws were quoted extensively in the New York Times article referenced in Section IV, supra.111
For example, Roger Pielke Jr., the director of the Sports Governance
Center at the University of Colorado, stated: “I think everyone can understand that if your data set is contaminated by as much as one-third
bad data, it’s kind of a garbage-in, garbage-out situation . . . . I really see
no option for [World Athletics] other than to retract the paper.”112 Erik
Boye, one of the independent researchers who heads the Department of
Cell Biology at Oslo University Hospital,113 added “the data [World
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
110. Id.
111. Longman, supra note 58.
112. Id.
113. Department of Cell Biology, OSLO U. HOSP., https://www.ous-research.no/cellbiology/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
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Athletics] have presented is not solid.”114 He further criticized World
Athletics for lack of transparency regarding the data, and “doing everything with their hands over the data.”115
A third independent researcher, Ross Tucker, a professor of exercise physiology who taught at the School of Medicine of the University
of the Free State in South Africa and is currently at the University of
Cape Town, stated that the original study is “entirely untrustworthy” and
that a subsequent study by World Athletics using the same data with the
errors purportedly thrown out included “too much uncertainty to
trust.”116 Concerning the subsequent World Athletics study, Pielke
commented that “[t]his is an effort at what I would call a do-over, and
it’s embarrassing and it’s not how science is expected to be done.”117
Concerning the lack of transparency and the fact that affiliates of World
Athletics authored BG17, Pielke stated “[y]ou don’t have drug companies doing their own studies that no one else can see.”118
These comments demonstrate that the evidence in BG17 and
BHKE18 does not meet the standards of the Daubert case. BG17 was
admittedly flawed, and the article allegedly correcting its errors was not
peer reviewed.
Furthermore, BG17 itself acknowledges that the studies do not explain any cause-and-effect relationship between testosterone and athletic
performance: “Our study design cannot provide evidence for causality
between androgen levels and athletic performance” but rather consists
solely of observations of results of males and females with differing levels of testosterone at two track and field world championship events.119
Lack of proof of a cause-and-effect relationship led to numerous speculative statements in BG17, speculation that would not be admissible in a
U.S. court.120 The speculative statements include:
-

“A possible explanation for these findings is the important contribution of oxidative metabolism in the total energy spent to run a
400 or 800 m race.”121

114. Longman, supra note 58.
115. Id.
116. Id.; ross tucker (international), ERGOSPORT MODELS, https://ergosportmodels.com/models/dr-ross-tucker/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
117. Longman, supra note 58.
118. Id.
119. Bermon & Garnier, supra at note 45, at 3.
120. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
121. Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 5.
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-

“Our hypothesis is that, in addition to their recognised effect on
aggressiveness and risk-taking behaviours, androgens exert their
ergogenic effects on some sportswomen through better visuo-spatial neural activation.”122

-

“One explanation could be the higher prevalence of doping with
exogenous androgens in this subgroup.”123

-

“Hence, the known negative influence of fat mass on SHBG concentration and T bioavailability may possibly account for the low
T and SHBG concentrations reported in male throwers in our
study.”124

-

“In female athletes, a high fT concentration appears to confer a
1.8-2.8% competitive advantage in long sprint and 800 m races.”125

-

“As androgens are erythropoietic hormones, it is tempting to hypothesise that female athletes with high T and fT levels show high
Hb concentrations which in turn increase the oxygen-carrying capacity and (non-bicarbonate) extracellular buffering capacity —
both of which are crucial when running 400 m, 400 m hurdles or
800 m races.”126

-

“Increased lean body mass, mental drive and aggressiveness, which
are also known to be influenced by androgens, provide alternative
explanations, but these parameters have not been measured in
the present study.”127

-

“Such a finding might be a consequence of either a higher prevalence of doping with androgens or a higher adiposity in this group
of athletic events.”128

-

“. . . the results obtained in pole vaulters and hammer throwers
seem to confirm that females with high levels of androgens may

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bermon & Garnier, supra note 45, at 5.
Id. at 6.
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also benefit from a competitive advantage through improved
visuospatial abilities.”129
(Emphasis added)
Because the scientific evidence of World Athletics would not likely be
admissible in a U.S. court, World Athletics’ arguments that its regulations are for the purpose of ensuring equal treatment should fail for lack
of evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
By far the most extraordinary claim of World Athletics is that it is
above the law. As noted in the Arbitration Award, “Regulation 1.2 provides that the DSD Regulations ‘operate globally’ and therefore ‘are to
be interpreted and applied not by reference to national or local laws, but
rather as an independent and autonomous text . . . .’ ” 130 CAS, however,
has now definitively ruled that, outside of Monaco, the DSD Regulations
are subject to national and local laws. Furthermore, as demonstrated
above, the DSD Regulations would not pass muster in a U.S. federal
court.

129. Id.
130. Semenya v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/O/5798,
Arbitral Award, 111, ¶ 427 (2019).

